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PUBLIC OR PRIVATE VENTURE CAPITAL?
Darian M. Ibrahim*
Abstract: The United States has an unparalled entrepreneurial ecosystem. Silicon Valley
startups commercialize cutting-edge science, create plentiful jobs, and spur economic
growth. Without angel investors and venture capital funds (VCs) willing to gamble on these
high-risk, high-tech companies, none of this would be possible.
From a law-and-economics perspective, startup investing is incredibly risky. Information
asymmetry and agency costs abound. In the United States, angels and VCs successfully
mitigate these problems through private ordering and informal means. Countries without the
robust private venture capital system that exists in the United States have attempted to fund
startups publicly by creating junior stock exchanges where startup stocks can be traded—
similar to the New York Stock Exchange, but on a smaller scale. These exchanges have
largely failed, however, in part because they have relied on mandatory disclosure and other
tools better suited to mitigating investment risk in established public companies.
The relative success of the United States in supplying private venture capital makes its
recent infatuation with crowdfunding curious. Fortunately, while crowdfunding was
originally designed to resemble public venture capital, with “funding portals” acting as the
junior stock exchanges, its final implementing rules took important steps back toward the
private venture capital model.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article compares two fundamental models for venture capital—
the public model, which is found in several countries outside of the
United States, and the private model, which is best exhibited in the
United States. Venture capital is broadly defined as funds invested in
rapid-growth, often high-tech startups.1 These startups are speculative,
high-risk, and sacrifice short-term profits for activities meant to pay off
in the future.2
In the United States, startups raise funds privately from venture
capital funds (VCs), angel investors, and venture lenders.3 Other
countries lack the infrastructure of private financing, a skilled high-tech
labor force, and past entrepreneurial successes that exists in the United
States, particularly in Silicon Valley,4 and they have therefore resorted to
public markets to supply startups with venture capital.5 These markets
1. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (1997) (“We define ‘venture
capital,’ consistent with American understanding, as investment by specialized venture capital
organizations . . . in high-growth, high-risk, often high-technology firms.”).
2. Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 583, 590 (2016) (“Venture capital is the term commonly used to describe investments in
highly speculative businesses, often early-stage technology companies.”).
3. The sources of private capital for startups generally progress as follows: friend-and-family or
crowdfunding, angel investors, venture capitalists, and venture lenders. I have written about many
of these. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 561, 569 (2015) [hereinafter Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding] (“In equity crowdfunding,
investors contribute money [over the Internet] in exchange for a tangible interest in the venture they
are funding . . . .”); Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1176
(2010) [hereinafter Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital] (“[A] robust venture debt industry exists in
the United States.”); Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1418 (2008) [hereinafter Ibrahim, Angel Investors] (“Angels fill the funding
gap [before VCs invest] as to both time and capital, functioning as a ‘conveyor belt’ that moves
young start-ups toward waiting venture capitalists.”).
4. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577–78 (1999)
[hereinafter Gilson, Legal Infrastructure]; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, 13
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 283, 286 (2013).
5. See infra Part III.
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have taken the form of junior stock exchanges, or public venture capital,
and thus far have not been successful at replicating the U.S. private
venture capital results in propelling early-stage companies to lucrative
trade sales6 or public offerings.7 Three of the most notable attempts at
public venture capital have been London’s Alternative Investment
Market (AIM), Germany’s Neuer Markt (NM), and Hong Kong’s
Growth Enterprise Market (GEM).8 While other countries have also
attempted to establish public venture capital,9 the AIM, NM, and GEM
are the most notable and offer differing approaches to regulation and
differing outcomes for fruitful academic study. In addition, their small
relative size and express intention to supply growth capital to startups
makes these junior stock exchanges more akin to the ecosystem found in
Silicon Valley, not the publicly-traded Nasdaq, though they were
initially touted as a rival to the latter.10
The holy grail for a startup company is to exit through an initial
public offering onto a country’s senior stock exchange, which provides
the most liquidity to investors.11 This Article explores the AIM, NM, and
GEM and examines why none of them have successfully served as a

6. Trade sales are sales of a startup company to a larger, established company within the same
general field. Fan, supra note 2, at 590 n.48 (“The [National Venture Capital Association]
Yearbook . . . notes: ‘[V]enture funds generally exit their positions in [successful mature portfolio]
companies by taking them public through an initial public offering (IPO) or by selling them to
presumably larger organizations (acquisition, trade sale, or increasingly a financial buyer).’”).
7. Cécile Carpentier, Jean-François L’Her & Jean-Marc Suret, Stock Exchange Markets for New
Ventures, 25 J. BUS. VENTURING 403, 403 (2010) (observing that junior stock exchanges in Europe
“have had varying, but generally negative, outcomes”); Jay R. Ritter, Differences Between
European and American IPO Markets, 9 EURO. FIN. MGMT. 421, 422 (2003) (excluding the AIM,
mini-stock exchanges “have consistently failed following market downturns”).
8. See infra Part III.
9. Toronto’s Toronto Stock Exchange Venture Exchange (TSXV) is a notable one. It was not
included in this study because a large portion of its listed companies are in the oil and gas and other
natural resource industries, as opposed to tech startups. See Carpentier et al., supra note 7, at 403–
04; Evan Rahn, Venturing into the Unchartered: How Carefully Created Venture Exchanges Can
Succeed While Bolstering the American Economy, 42 J. CORP. L. 257, 268 (2016) (“Around 57% of
the listed companies on the [TSXV] are mining companies.”); infra note 77.
10. David B. Audretsch & Erik E. Lehmann, The Neuer Markt as an Institution of Creation and
Destruction, 4 INT. ENTREP. MANAG. J. 419, 420 (2008) (“[T]he Deutsche Boerse AG founded the
Neuer Markt as a privately organized market, which was at least at a rhetorical level modeled on the
US’s [Nasdaq] . . . .”); Laura He, Future Still in Doubt for Hong Kong’s ‘Quirky’ Small-Cap
Exchange, the GEM, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (June 24, 2017, 1:30 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/business/markets/article/2099757/future-still-doubt-hong-kongs-quirkysmall-cap-exchange-gem [https://perma.cc/P2XZ-DW2P] (noting the GEM was created to be Hong
Kong’s “very own Nasdaq”).
11. Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (“IPOs
are the gold standard in VC success.”).
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stepping stone to that country’s senior stock exchange (like the U.S.’s
Nasdaq or NYSE). For startups to attract venture capital, from either
public or private investors, they must solve two major problems. First,
prior to investment, investors must mitigate information asymmetry, or
the consequence of entrepreneurs knowing more about their businesses
than investors do.12 Second, after investment, investors must reduce
agency costs, or the risk that entrepreneurs can mismanage or use
investor funds for personal gain.13
Due to early-stage companies having sparse track records and
technological uncertainty, information asymmetry and agency costs exist
in extreme form in startup investing.14 This Article offers a contrast in
dealing with these problems. The U.S. approach is to tackle them
through private ordering and informal mechanisms. Lacking the ability
to address them in the same way, the foreign public approach relies on
corporate and securities law, similar to our public markets for
established companies. Although the public approach works for
established companies, it cannot compensate for the exacerbated nature
of the risks present in startup investing.15 Finally, the Article argues that
the United States took an ill-advised step toward creating its own public
venture capital when it legalized crowdfunding in the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012.16 In a fortuitous turn, however,
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) final implementing
rules in 2015—Regulation Crowdfunding (hereinafter “Regulation
CF”)—reversed course and situated crowdfunding as an important part
of the private venture capital system that preceded it.17
Some caveats are in order. First, this is a law-and-economics article.
There are likely cultural differences among countries that also explain
differing levels of entrepreneurship, and thus a venture capital system’s
success or failure.18 Legal design more broadly, such as the strength of
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Engineering].
15. See Carpentier et al., supra note 7, at 405 (echoing the “widely accepted assessment that a
public VC market cannot succeed because it lacks the specific skills and tools to deal with the
asymmetry of information and agency problems specific to new ventures”).
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business
Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310 (2015) (explaining how Chapter 11 bankruptcies lock
entrepreneurs into a failing business when that entrepreneur’s talents could be better used
establishing new companies); John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the
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courts and other institutions, also plays a role.19 The extensive LLSV
literature finds that strong protections for minority shareholders is a key
determinant of how well-developed a country’s capital markets tend to
be.20 Further, this Article draws from publicly available information on
public venture capital abroad, and the author has not spent time in those
countries talking to people on the ground about their experiences.21
Despite these caveats and limitations, this Article weaves together a
compelling narrative underscoring the importance of private ordering in
venture capital and an entrepreneurial economy.
I.

TWIN GOALS: MITIGATING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
AND AGENCY COSTS

Two main problems exist when ownership and control of a
corporation are separated: information asymmetry and agency costs.22
Information asymmetry exists when one party knows more than
another.23 In investing, corporate management knows more about the
company and its prospects than investors do.24 Investors obviously wish
to mitigate this asymmetry from the outset to make smart investments.25

Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 435–36 (2000); Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens
of Innovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 975–76 (2016).
19. The private ordering of the U.S. model would be untenable without strong courts that uphold
contract rights. See Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1 (1998) (“A modernizing nation’s economic prosperity requires
at least a modest legal infrastructure centered on the protection of property and contract rights.”).
20. Rafael la Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1145−51 (1998) (discussing
how a lack of protection for investors leads to high concentration of stock ownership); Rafael la
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131 (1997) (noting how
countries with poor protection for investors have “smaller and narrower capital markets”).
21. The benefits of qualitative research in legal studies were famously shown by Stewart
Macaulay’s study of Wisconsin businessmen. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
22. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) (discussing the separation of ownership and control that has come
to define public corporations).
23. See Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 91, 91 (1998).
24. Id. at 92 (“[T]he single largest cost that stands between issuers and investors is the problem of
asymmetric information. The issuer knows the quality of the securities being offering, but the
investor does not and cannot easily find out.”).
25. Good corporate management actually wants to mitigate the asymmetry too, as investors
discount share price less. Roy Shapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and Co-optation, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2012) (“Insiders know more than outsiders. Both have incentives to
mitigate the asymmetry.”)
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Within corporations, agency costs present themselves after the
investment.26 Due to the separation of ownership and control that
characterizes modern corporations of any size, shareholders must
delegate authority to directors to manage the corporation.27 Agency costs
in this context are the risk that directors use shareholders’ investments
unwisely or for personal gain.28 Agency costs are often referred to as the
risk of opportunism.29
The next sections examine the traditional ways to reduce information
asymmetry and agency costs in corporations characterized by a
separation of ownership and control, where agency costs are highest.
Because these are typically public corporations, the solutions tend to be
“public” as well. In other words, rather than rely on private ordering in a
situation where meaningful contracting is difficult,30 legal rules with
private/public enforcement mechanisms serve as the risk reduction
mechanism. These legal rules are primarily corporate and securities
laws. While the public venture capital systems abroad use similar public
risk-reduction tools, the next sections focus on the federal securities and
state corporate laws of the United States.

26. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 354−55 (1976) (defining agency costs).
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018) (empowering the board of directors to manage the
“business and affairs of every corporation”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 559 n.61 (2002) (“All state
corporate codes provide for a system of nearly absolute delegation of power to the board of
directors, which in turn is authorized to further delegate power to subordinate firm agents.” (citing
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.01 cmt. (1995) (reviewing statutes)).
28. See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 955, 974 (2007) (categorizing agency costs as resulting from an agent’s “(1) insufficient effort
or shirking; (2) lavish compensation or self-dealing; (3) entrenchment; and (4) poor risk
management”). Agency costs also exist between majority and minority shareholders. See REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 21−22 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 986−90 (2006) (explaining how VC board control can reduce or
prevent opportunism by entrepreneurs); Rudolf Richter, The New Institutional Economics: Its Start,
Its Meaning, Its Prospects, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161, 179 (2005) (noting that the central
problem of transaction cost economics is ex-post opportunism).
30. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1627 (2001) (describing “the current
prevailing view of the corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts,’ with the contracts or agreements
between the board of directors and the shareholders and creditors as the nodes of particular interest
to corporate law”); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1444 (1985) (arguing that despite the “nexus of contracts”
moniker, corporations should not be treated as other contracts because they are not entered into in
the same way).
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Securities Law

Securities laws are the primary means of reducing information
asymmetries for investors in public corporations. Tracing to the New
Deal, the existing body of securities laws is a federally-imposed
disclosure-based system, meaning that regulators will not pass judgment
on the desirability of securities so long as companies disclose all
relevant information to potential investors.31 Investors come in different
forms, from information traders32 to ordinary retail investors.33
Information traders, or those funds and institutions engaged in the
securities-trading business, have the expertise and financial incentive to
digest mandatory disclosures.34 Ordinary retail investors do not,35
although the argument is these investors still benefit from informationtrader buying and selling and the corresponding movement of the stock
price.36

31. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
(justifying a disclosure regime with the famous phrase: “Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants”); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1076 (1995) (“Early in the process of drafting the Securities Act [of 1933], the
administration considered and rejected merit review in favor of a pure disclosure statute . . . .”).
32. Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for Corporate Disclosure, 35
YALE J. ON REG. 383, 401−06 (2018) (contrasting information traders, who buy and sell based on
early access to information relevant to a company’s fundamentals, with noise traders, who trade
based on early access to irrelevant information).
33. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (2009) (noting that retail investors are “individuals
and households—as opposed to institutional investors”).
34. Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Yu-Ting Forester Wong, Mandatory Disclosure
and Individual Investors: Evidence from the JOBS Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293, 303 (2015)
(“Empirical work has shown that institutional investors are better able to process financial
disclosures than individual shareholders . . . .”); Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation?
Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1418 n.93
(“Institutional investors are used to the disclosure format and content of the full-fledged, SECmandated prospectus.”).
35. Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal,
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 19 (1994) (“[M]ost investors do not read, let
alone thoroughly analyze, financial statements, prospectuses, or other corporate disclosures . . . .”).
36. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). But see Kevin S. Haeberle, Information Asymmetry and the Protection of
Ordinary
Investors
42,
45–46
(June
21,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222292 [https://perma.cc/X2WG-V7X7] (arguing that a sizeable portion
of the ordinary-investor universe is actually helped by, not hurt by, the presence of information
asymmetry).
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Securities law scholars have long debated the effectiveness of
mandatory disclosure’s role in reducing information asymmetry.37 They
note that there are three types of information costs to mitigate: the costs
of acquiring information, the costs of processing information, and the
costs of verifying information.38 Mandatory disclosure reduces the costs
of acquiring information by forcing corporations to release information
to the markets at pre-set times.39 By further mandating that disclosures
be standardized, the securities laws reduce the cost of processing
information by allowing investors to compare complicated financial
information apples-to-apples across firms.40 Verification costs are
reduced by antifraud rules like Rule 10(b)(5) of the Securities and
Exchange Act, and the SEC standing with private litigants on
enforcement.41
Securities laws also reduce agency costs.42 Because mandatory
disclosure forces companies to reveal important actions and information,
shareholders can police management more effectively.43 State corporate
law (discussed below) is well-equipped to deal with agency costs in the
form of managerial self-dealing; however, the business judgment rule
defers to managers on decisions not involving self-interest or bad faith.44
37. Compare, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 649
(2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Digital Shareholder] (“Mandatory disclosure addresses both
information asymmetry and agency costs in public companies. The insiders who know lots of
information about the company must share that information with the public, thus reducing
information asymmetry.”), with Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a
World of Complexity, 2004 ILL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (“[I]n a world of complexity, disclosure can be
insufficient to remedy the information asymmetry . . . .”); Fan, supra note 2, at 607 (“There are
those in the legal academy who argue that increased disclosure, in and of itself, is not sufficient in
the complex world in which we live.”).
38. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 594–95 (1984).
39. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 716 (2006) (“Disclosure duties reduce . . . information gathering costs.”); id. at 738
(“Absent mandatory disclosure duties, information traders would engage in duplicative efforts to
uncover nonpublic information.”).
40. See id. at 738 (“[S]ecurities regulation mandates a specific format for disclosure, which
further reduces the costs of analyzing information and comparing it to data provided by other
firms.”) (citations omitted).
41. See id. at 741 (“The ban on fraud and manipulation reduces verification costs, because
explicit information cannot be misstated, material facts cannot be omitted, and implicit information
cannot be manipulated.”).
42. See Mahoney, supra note 31, at 1048.
43. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 39, at 717 (“Disclosure duties help reveal management
actions.”).
44. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating the business judgment rule is a
presumption that the directors “acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
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Securities laws help fill that void, as mandatory disclosure works in
connection with market mechanisms to discipline managerial
mismanagement.45 Institutional investors have the resources and
incentives to process and respond to such disclosures, and analysts
following the company will also take note.46 Despite grumblings about
the compliance costs, companies that list on the NASDAQ or NYSE
effectively “bond” their reputations by opting into mandatory disclosure
and SEC enforcement.47 Foreign firms listing on U.S. exchanges
increase their share values due to the bonding effect.48
B.

Corporate Law

Unlike securities regulation, U.S. corporate law exists on a state level
with Delaware as the dominant producer.49 Although securities
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company”), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
45. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 39, at 718 (“Intense coverage by analysts . . . is the
most effective antidote to management agency costs. In contrast to judges, analysts are capable of
evaluating the quality of managements’ business decisions and reflect their opinions in stock
prices.”).
46. Kelli A. Alces, Legal Diversification, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1977, 2010 (2013) (“Sophisticated
stock analysts can follow publicly traded companies, inform investors of the condition of those
companies, and give advice about how to trade in the company’s securities.”).
47. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 673–74 (1999) [hereinafter,
Coffee, The Future as History] (discussing how multinational firms with a choice of where to list
their securities migrate to U.S. securities markets as a form of bonding); see also John C. Coffee,
Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on
International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1830 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee,
Racing Towards the Top?] (“Cross-listing may in part be . . . a bonding mechanism to assure public
investors that they will not be exploited . . . .”). But see Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the CrossListing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1857, 1898 (2007) (empirically disputing the bonding
hypothesis by showing that cross-listing premiums declined after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002).
48. Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 47, at 674 (noting “the finding, repeatedly
observed by financial economists, that the announcement of a dual listing on a U.S. exchange by a
foreign firm typically increases the firm’s share value”); id. (“One explanation for the abnormal
price movement on a U.S. listing is that such a listing represents a bonding mechanism: the foreign
issuer is increasing the share value of its public shares by agreeing to comply with the generally
higher disclosure standards that prevail in the United States.”).
49. Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca:
Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 866 (2014) (“Delaware dominates the corporatechartering market in the U.S.—it is the only state that attracts a significant number of out-of-state
incorporations.”); cf. Seth C. Oranburg, Democratizing Startups, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1013,
1020 (2016) (discussing Berle and Means’s calls for federal incorporation after penning their
seminal work on the separation of ownership and control that had come to characterize
corporations).
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regulation plays a role in reducing agency costs, that task has primarily
been relegated to state corporate law.50 Agency costs inside corporations
come in two main forms: opportunism and mismanagement.
Opportunism—or a corporate manager benefiting himself financially
at the expense of shareholders—is governed by directors’ fiduciary duty
of loyalty.51 The duty of loyalty subjects conflicts of interest to rigorous
scrutiny.52 Basic self-dealing transactions between a director and the
corporation are cleansed by a sound process or fair result to the
corporation.53 When a director usurps a corporate opportunity, a court
will determine whether the director’s taking of the opportunity
constituted disloyalty.54 Generally speaking, corporate law is considered
effective at reducing agency costs arising from directors’ conflicts of
interest.55
Agency costs from mismanagement, on the other hand, are governed
by the fiduciary duty of care. But while the duty of care instructs
directors to act as reasonably prudent people, the business judgment rule

50. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 82 (3d Ed. 2015) (“Much of corporate law is
best understood as a mechanism for constraining . . . . . [agency] costs.”); Goshen & Parchomovsky,
supra note 39, at 748 (“[S]ecurities regulation complements corporate law in reducing management
agency costs.”); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2075, 2080 (2016) (“Mainstream corporate law scholarship . . . remains centrally
focused on the agency cost problem . . . .”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 740–48 (1997) (discussing the agency problem as the central
problem of corporate governance).
51. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 751 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]here is no
safe-harbor for divided loyalties in Delaware, and that the duty of loyalty, in essence, ‘mandates that
the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders take[] precedence over any interest
possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders
generally.’”(quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citing Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983))).
52. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6–7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (nowing how conflicts “between
self-interest and fiduciary obligation, are, when challenged, examined with the most scrupulous
care”).
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2004) (stating that conflicts of interest with a self-dealing
director can be cleansed by disinterested director or shareholder approval or by proving the
transaction is fair to the corporation).
54. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 224–25 (1986) (“[T]he difficult issue is to
determine what should be deemed, as between corporation and fiduciary, to belong to the
corporation, and why.”); D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial
Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1561 (2013) (“There are a number of tests that courts
may choose in defining corporate versus fiduciary opportunities . . . .”); Eric Talley, Turning Servile
Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE
L.J. 277, 280 (1998) (referring to the opportunities doctrine as a “doctrinal quagmire”).
55. Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1231, 1233 (2010) (“Only violations of the duty of loyalty [are] likely to lead to liability.”).
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protects them from liability absent gross negligence.56 The business
judgment rule is a presumption that directors act on an informed basis,
loyally, and free from bad faith.57 Further, Delaware and other states
allow shareholders to pre-exculpate directors from any duty of care
breaches by including a provision to that effect in the corporate charter.58
Therefore, in practice, corporate law has delegated policing simple
mismanagement to market-based solutions (for example, unhappy
shareholders selling their shares) rather than legal liability remedies.59
The problems of information asymmetry and agency costs in public
company investing become even more pronounced when discussing
startup investing.60 Because startups have no track records, no proven
product or service, and may be run by a first-time entrepreneur, investors
face extreme levels of information asymmetry.61 Even with mandatory
disclosure, the question is: how much is there to disclose?62 Agency
costs arise before investment as entrepreneurs may have differing
objectives and timeframes for liquidity and exit than investors.63 For
56. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 573,
n.1 (describing the elements of the business judgment rule as “(1) good-faith, (2) no self-dealing or
self-interest, (3) an informed decision, and (4) a reasonable belief that the decision is in the best
interest of the corporation”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 81, 81 (2004) (describing the business judgment rule as “corporate
law’s central doctrine, pervasively affecting the roles of directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders”).
57. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244 (Del. 2000).
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018).
59. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965); J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 43 (1977)
(“[T]he existing business organization regulatory system depends to a far greater extent on
competitive market restraints than on legal restraints . . . .”); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the
Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 1003−04 (2009); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and
Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1995) (“A developed
market for shares can be an investor’s most valued protection, offering liquidity that often is more
useful than any legal provision.”).
60. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1076 (“The special character of venture capital
contracting is shaped by the fact that investing in early stage, high technology companies presents
these problems [of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs] in an extreme form.”).
61. Id. at 1077 (“[T]he fact that the portfolio company’s technology involves cutting-edge science
assures that there will be a substantial information asymmetry in favor of the entrepreneur even if
the venture capital fund employs individuals with advanced scientific training.”).
62. Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Signals, 53 GA. L. REV. 197, 215 (2018) [hereinafter
Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Signals] (“Disclosure . . . no matter how robust, can only do so much when
companies have limited track records . . . .”).
63. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1077 (“Because the entrepreneur’s stake in a portfolio
company with venture capital financing can be fairly characterized as an option, the entrepreneur’s
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example, either entrepreneurs wish to keep the startup private longer to
continue to extract private benefits such as a high salary,64 or they wish
to sell the startup earlier to pursue another venture.65
Any system of venture capital that is to thrive must successfully
address information asymmetry and agency costs in startup investing.
Otherwise, rational investors will not take the risks of funding these
ventures. The next Part builds on the preceding discussion to ask
whether the public mechanisms of securities regulation and corporate
law can adequately mitigate information asymmetry and agency costs in
startup investing as they do in public company investing.
II.

PUBLIC VENTURE CAPITAL: JUNIOR STOCK EXCHANGES

Countries other than the United States do not have the same robust
private venture capital system as found in Silicon Valley.66 A few quotes
from commentators who have studied venture capital in other countries
are indicative of the general consensus. Spanning the globe,
commentators note that: “Europe is often considered as a polar case to
that of the U.S., with its immature venture capital industry”67; “New
Zealand has long had a much thinner pool of VC and angel financing
[than the United States], even for its size”68; and “[t]he United States has

interests will sharply diverge from those of the venture capital investors, especially with respect to
the risk level and duration of the investment.”)
64. Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital
Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 56 (Michael J. Whincop ed.,
2001) (“Because the entrepreneur reaps private benefits from his involvement with the firm . . . he
may be unwilling to sell or liquidate the firm, or to step down as CEO where doing so is the most
financially attractive alternative available to the investor.”).
65. Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-Backed Start-Ups Reject Venture Capital?, 2 MICH. J. PRIV.
EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 251, 260–61 (2013) (discussing this argument); see also BASIL
PETERS, EARLY EXITS: EXIT STRATEGIES FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND ANGEL INVESTORS (BUT
MAYBE NOT VENTURE CAPITALISTS) (1.2 ed. 2009).
66. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 743 (2010)
[hereinafter Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley] (discussing attempts at replicating Silicon
Valley abroad).
67. Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin, Euro.NM and the Financing of European Innovative Firms
1 (IGIER, Working Paper No. 171, 2000); see also Valérie Revest & Sandro Sapio, Financing
Technology-Based Small Firms in Europe: What Do We Know?, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 179, 185
(2012) [hereinafter, Revest & Sapio, Financing Technology-Based Small Firms] (noting that
“venture capital in continental Europe [is] lagging behind” in part due to “the weaker development
of pension funds in bank-based European financial systems”).
68. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885, 892
(2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding].
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a much more fully developed venture capital market than Germany. The
differences are of both size and substance.”69
The U.S. got lucky. As Ron Gilson explains, Silicon Valley—home to
the United States’ most vibrant VC ecosystem—developed due to
California’s historical prohibition on employee covenants not to compete
(allowing labor mobility and knowledge spillover), military funding of
new technologies during World War II, and the presence of Stanford
University.70 Boston’s high-tech region, known as Route 128, similarly
enjoyed help from military funding during World War II, the presence of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the first U.S. venture
capital firm.71 Further, the United States is a stock-market-centric
economy, which Gilson and Bernard Black argue is a prerequisite to
having a strong private venture capital system.72 European economies,
such as Germany, are bank-centric,73 and startups are not traditionally
good candidates for bank financing due to their lack of track records and
sacrificing of near-term profits for a long-term focus.74
Without sufficient private venture capital,75 other countries have
established public venture capital in the form of junior stock exchanges.
These junior stock exchanges are exchanges where startups can list their
stock for purchase, and public investors can buy in. This Article explores
three such attempts at public venture capital: London’s Alternative
69. Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 246.
70. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1069; see also Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold?
Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613, 616 (2017) (“The Silicon
Valley labor force benefits from conditions that are likely to be as effective in protecting their
interests as any disclosure-based registration system could provide.”).
71. See SPENCER E. ANTE, CREATIVE CAPITAL: GEORGES DORIOT AND THE BIRTH OF VENTURE
CAPITAL 129–46 (2008).
72. Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 245 (explaining that IPO exits are “available only through a
stock market . . . [and allow] venture capital providers to enter into implicit contracts with
entrepreneurs concerning future control of startup firms, in a way not available in a bank-centered
capital market”).
73. See John W. Sell, The Neuer Markt is Dead. Long Live the Neuer Markt!, 12 INT’L
ADVANCES iN ECON. RES. 191, 192 (2006) (Germany’s “heavy reliance on bank financing meant
that Germany’s equity markets remained small when compared to other economies of similar size
and development.”).
74. See David B. Audretsch & Julie A. Elston, Can Institutional Change Impact High-Technology
Firm Growth?: Evidence from Germany’s Neuer Markt, 25 J. PROD. ANAL. 9, 10 (2006) (“While
the American entrepreneurial revolution was fuelled by plentiful venture capital, angel capital and
informal capital, the highly restrictive and traditional financial institutions seemingly pre-empted
the possibility of developing high-technology startups in Germany.”). But see Ibrahim, Debt as
Venture Capital, supra note 3, at 1186 (explaining how venture lending to U.S. startups is prevalent
because of the robust system of private venture capital in the U.S.).
75. Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 245 (“Other countries have openly envied the U.S. venture
capital market and have actively, but unsuccessfully, sought to replicate it.”).
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Investment Market (AIM), Germany’s Neuer Markt (NM), and Hong
Kong’s Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). Other junior stock exchanges
sprouted up around the same time, spanning Europe,76 North America,77
and Asia.78 The AIM, NM, and GEM are three of the most notable
examples of junior stock exchanges, and they offer stark contrasts in
their methods of reducing information asymmetry and agency costs.
Further, the AIM, NM, and GEM have had varying levels of success and
failure—mostly failure in the ultimate goal of propelling companies to
the equivalent of the U.S. initial public offering (IPO). As an important
preliminary note, these exchanges are too small to compare to the United
States’ Nasdaq,79 and often supply the first growth capital to startups,
making Silicon Valley their apt comparison.80 Therefore, the comparison
76. See Ritter, supra note 7, at 422 (discussing how junior stock exchanges were established in
the late 1990s in “Italy (the Nuovo Mercato), the Netherlands (Nieuwe Markt), Belgium (Euro.NM
Belgium), and France (the Nouveau Marché)”).
77. The TSXV was not used for comparison for two reasons. First, it has historically been
dominated by natural resource companies, not technology startups. Tim Shufelt, TSX Ventures into
New Territory, THE GLOBE & MAIL, January 23, 2018 (Ontario edition). Recently it has taken a
turn toward marijuana and cryptocurrency companies; still not a good comparison. Id. (“Frenzied
trading in pot stocks and blockchain companies has abruptly transformed the TSX Venture
Exchange from a market almost wholly dependent on natural resources into a clearinghouse for
some of the hottest trends in investing.”). Second, Canada is developing a “burgeoning private
capital industry” more like the U.S., making TSXV substitute and competitor to private venture
financing. Carpentier et al., supra note 7, at 406 (“VC is indeed present in Canada . . . this country
[is] generally credited with having one of the highest levels [of VC] in the world relative to its
population or its economy.”); Tim Shufelt, Small-Cap Blues: Why the Venture Bourse Is in the
Dumps, THE GLOBE & MAIL, June 3, 2017 (Ontario edition).
78. A report on GEM compares it to “AIM, Catalist, ChiNext, Mothers, NasdaqCX and TSX
Venture. These junior exchanges are selected for comparison with GEM as they cover a reasonable
portion of the global growth company landscape spanning the Asia-Pacific, European and Americas
Regions.” HONG KONG EXCHANGES AND CLEARING LIMITED, CONSULTATION PAPER: REVIEW OF
THE GROWTH ENTERPRISE MARKET (GEM) AND CHANGES TO THE GEM AND MAIN BOARD
LISTING RULES 4 (2017) [hereinafter Consultation Paper].
79. See Jose M. Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-Tier Listing Venues: The Rise of the
Alternative Investment Market, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 288–89 (2008) (“While the average
market capitalization for an AIM company is close to $70 million, NASDAQ’s average is closer to $ 1
billion . . . .”); Serena Ng, NASDAQ Pulls Harder for Listing Switches, WALL STREET J., Feb. 26, 2009, at
C1 (discussing how NASDAQ drew companies with a combined market capitalization of $80 billion
away from NYSE in 2008, while NYSE only drew companies with a combined market capitalization of
$8 billion from NASDAQ in the same year); Andrew Beattie, The Birth of Stock Exchanges,
INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/stock-exchange-history.asp
[https://perma.cc/3NEK-QZRB] (noting how NASDAQ is one of the “two largest stock exchanges in the
world” along with NYSE).
80. He, supra note 10 (noting how the GEM was modeled on Nasdaq, but its real function was to
offer technology startups an early option for raising capital); see Alternative Investment Market:
What Is it and How Does it Work?, THE TELEGRAPH, (Mar. 24, 2016, 3:48 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/investing/online-investments/alternative-investment-market-defined/
[https://perma.cc/SHA7-DX7X] (describing the type of companies looking to join the AIM as
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of junior stock exchanges abroad to U.S. private venture capital—not
our public stock exchanges—is appropriate both because of the
similarities in size and purpose.81
A.

London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

The London Stock Exchange (LSE) established the Alternative
Investment Market, or the AIM, as a junior stock exchange in 1995.82
The AIM caters to companies that are early in their growth cycles and do
not meet the listing requirements for the LSE.83 The AIM is notable for
offering “light-touch” regulation, meaning less stringent disclosure
requirements and admission standards than the LSE and other major
stock exchanges globally.84
The AIM’s “light-touch” regulation is often credited as a significant
factor for its success, as it reduces listing costs and ongoing costs of
remaining listed.85 While the AIM’s regulation is “light-touch,” what
regulation exists is critical to the success of the AIM.86 The AIM is
based on a principle of self-regulation, and the low regulatory burden
works in concert with that perspective.87 Companies listed on the AIM
are expected to comply with relatively low disclosure requirements and
obligations.88 But both the LSE and the AIM’s own regulatory service

smaller companies looking for “a well-established, regulated place to access new capital and move
into new growth phases”).
81. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 263 (“AIM covers a funding gap for companies whose specific
characteristics preclude them from listing in senior markets such as NASDAQ, the NYSE, or the
LSE.”)
82. Revest & Sapio, Financing Technology-Based Small Firms, supra note 67, at 14 (“The
London Stock Exchange . . . [created] the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in June 1995.”).
83. See Mendoza, supra note 79, at 263, 298; James Chen, Alternative Investment Market (AIM),
INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alternative-investmentmarket.asp [https://perma.cc/U4XB-HAS7].
84. The AIM has a “comply-or-explain” policy for items beyond the basics. See Mendoza, supra
note 79, at 295 (“The genius of AIM’s regulatory model lies with the comply-or-explain option
provided to each listed company to adapt to the exchange’s flexible and reduced set of rules.”); id.
at 301 (“AIM does not impose stringent admission requirements on companies seeking entry to the
market. The few objective listing criteria set forth by the exchange can be complied with
easily . . . .”). This resembles the United States rule that public companies must have codes of
conduct for senior management or explain why they do not. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 406, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7264 (2012).
85. See Mendoza, supra note 79, at 296 (“[C]ompanies seeking an AIM listing are not subject to
significant admission requirements.”).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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have shown that they will tweak AIM rules as needed.89 The AIM’s
quick responses to issues that arise helps to bolster the “light-touch”
model, as it promotes investor confidence in the market.90
In place of regulation, the AIM hinges investor protection on the use
of Nominated Advisors, or “Nomads.”91 Nomads are experienced
financial firms, similar to investment banks in the United States, that
every company listing on the AIM must hire.92 Examples of Nomads
include finnCap Group PLC, Cenkos Securities PLC, and W.H. Ireland
Ltd.; names more familiar to U.S. readers include Cantor Fitzgerald and
Grant Thornton.93
Like investment banks in the United States, Nomads serve as
reputational intermediaries between non-established companies and
investors, renting their reputations to the companies that hire them.94 A
Nomad acts as “gatekeeper, advisor, and ultimately, regulator, of
AIM.”95 The Nomad’s primary role is to vet a startup before listing on
the AIM.96 Even after listing, the Nomad is broadly charged with serving
89. See id. at 299 (“The oversight roles of its own regulation service, and that of the LSE, also
play a part in the success of AIM’s model. Both have proven to be highly responsive regulators,
adjusting AIM’s rules promptly and according to market need.”).
90. See Mendoza, supra note 79, at 292–93.
91. Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 138 (2007)
(“The key to AIM regulation is the nominated advisor.”); see also Choosing Your Advisers,
LONDON
STOCK
EXCHANGE,
https://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-andadvisors/aim/for-companies/choosing/advisor.htm [https://perma.cc/3BSX-5YQ5].
92. See Janet Austin, How Do I Sell My Crowdfunded Shares? Developing Exchanges and
Markets to Trade Securities Issued by Start-ups and Small Companies, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 21, 27 (2018) (“A NOMAD is a firm of experienced corporate finance professionals who
are approved by the London Stock Exchange.”); Stephane Rousseau, London Calling?: The
Experience of the Alternative Investment Market and the Competitiveness of Canadian Stock
Exchanges, 23 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 51, 63 (2007); Mendoza, supra note 79, at 316 n.323
(noting that, among qualifications, “Nomad applicants must (i) have practiced corporate finance for
a period of at least two years”); id. at 302 (“AIM requires Nomads to soundly understand an
applicant’s business plans, management structure, and financial and legal status before certifying
that a firm is qualified for listing.”).
93. See Our Services, FINNCAP, https://www.finncap.com/our-services [https://perma.cc/GV8R789V]; Our Services, CENKOs SECURITIES, https://www.cenkos.com/our-services/corporate-finance
[https://perma.cc/MTL2-HXAC]; Corporate & Institutional Broking, W.H. IRELAND PLC,
https://www.whirelandplc.com/corporate-broking/ [https://perma.cc/X3GN-UC72]. The AIM’s
Nomad Database includes forty-five registered Nomads. See Nomad Search, LONDON STOCK
EXCHANGE,
https://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/companies-and-advisors/aim/forcompanies/nomad-result.html?name=&city=&contact=&sector=&search=search&page=1
[https://perma.cc/83QZ-78R8].
94. Davidoff, supra note 91, at 138 (same); Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 601
(discussing Nomads as reputational intermediaries).
95. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 316.
96. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 601.
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as that startup’s regulator, though a Nomad’s liability for “its”
company’s noncompliance is less clear.97 Despite the Internet and its
corresponding troves of information, intermediaries remain critical
players in securities transactions.98 Hiring a top Nomad reduces
information asymmetry indirectly by signaling a company’s quality to
potential investors.99 In other words, if a top Nomad vouches for a
company by serving as its Nomad, a potential investor without
knowledge of the company can make a rational assumption, based on its
knowledge of the Nomad, that the Nomad must have confidence in the
company.
London’s status as a global financial center provides another factor
working in the AIM’s favor: its investor base tends to be institutional
rather than retail.100 In 2005, institutional investors controlled over 40%
of shares in the AIM market.101 Institutional investors, due to their
sophistication and experience with investing, are less vulnerable to being
duped than retail investors.102 The prevalence of institutional investors
97. Disciplinary measures against Nomads and other sponsors appears to resemble SEC
enforcement of gatekeepers in the U.S. See generally Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for
Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 916 (1998); Justin Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 1579 (2013).
98. See Iris H-Y Chiu, Securities Intermediaries in the Internet Age and the Traditional
Principal-Agent Model of Regulation: Some Observations from European Union Securities
Regulation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 307, 312 (2007) (“Research has shown that the arrival of
advanced technology, the Internet, and widened access to information has not rendered
intermediaries irrelevant.”).
99. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 600–01 (“The LSE considers the Nomadcompany relationship so important that if a company terminates its Nomad, trading in the
company’s securities is suspended until it hires a new Nomad.”); see London Stock Exchange: AIM:
The Role of the Nominated Advisor and Other Advisors, NI BUSINESS INFO [hereinafter The Role of
the Nominated Advisor], https://www.nibusinessinfo.co.uk/content/role-nominated-adviser-andother-advisers [https://perma.cc/L33D-Z32L] (noting that in addition to the Nomad, a company
wishing to list on the AIM must retain a broker, a reporting accountant, a legal advisor, and a public
relations firm).
100. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 297 (“[W]ealthy individuals with experience in securities
trading, institutional investors, and entities specializing in AIM investments comprise most of
AIM’s investor base . . . .”); see Hse-Yu Chiu, Can UK Small Businesses Obtain Growth Capital in
the Public Equity Markets—An Overview of the Shortcomings in UK and European Securities
Regulation and Considerations for Reform, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 933, 957 (2003) (“In the UK,
institutional investors dominate the retail market. As a result, the nature of the capital market in the
UK is sophisticated and caters to large value transactions.”). But see Mendoza, supra note 79, at 297
(“[T]he LSE does attract more retail investors to AIM by offering certain advantages, including tax
breaks for individuals that invest in its low-tier market segment.”).
101. Rousseau, supra note 92, at 57.
102. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 297, note 207; Austin, supra note 92, at 29–31; Sam Meadows,
AIM Offers Tax Perks and Divis—But Some Investors Lose Everything, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Sep. 8, 2018, at 5.
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on the AIM is a draw for companies considering listing there, with the
AIM viewed as providing “a community of knowledgeable
professionals.”103 One piece sums up the AIM’s design nicely: “AIM
was the first-mover in supplying the marketplace with a lower regulatory
burden, while enhancing listed companies’ reputations and providing
access to institutional investors seeking firms with long-term growth
potential.”104
The AIM has been held out as an initially successful junior stock
exchange that led to imitators.105 The AIM reached a high of 399 new
listings in 2005, but they had dropped to forty-seven new listings a
decade later.106 In total, an excess of 3,600 companies have participated
with the AIM, raising more than £98 billion.107 Of that money raised on
the AIM, approximately 60% was the result of further issues by already
listed companies—not new company listings.108 The AIM catered to a
broader range of companies than simply high-tech startups, allowing it
to weather tech market cyclical fluctuations and downturns.109
In terms of supplying public venture capital, however, the AIM has
been less successful. To mimic the U.S. private venture capital approach,
a junior stock exchange should be a stepping stone to an exit onto the
country’s senior stock exchange—the equivalent of a U.S. IPO.110 The
AIM, meanwhile, has not vaulted companies to the LSE; but it has, in

103. Rousseau, supra note 92, at 57.
104. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 288.
105. Id. at 262–63 (noting how light-touch regulation “propelled AIM’s rise as one of the world’s
fastest growing exchanges, as measured by the number of initial public offerings . . . . AIM’s
thriving success led to an outbreak of similar trading venues across Europe.”).
106. Austin, supra note 92, at 27.
107. FAQs, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, https://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-andadvisors/aim/faq/faq.htm [https://perma.cc/2GEE-ET7V].
108. Id.
109. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 292 (Europe’s “New Markets narrowly focused on high-tech
companies, whose massive downturn during the dot com bubble burst helped bring about their
demise. AIM companies’ broader range of economic activities could be what allowed it to endure
the demise of the technology sector worldwide.”).
110. Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey MacIntosh, Boom, Bust, and Litigation in Venture Capital
Finance, 40 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 867, 870 (2004) (“IPOs and acquisitions are relatively more
desirable forms of exit for higher quality entrepreneurial firms . . . . Other forms of exit such as
secondary sales, buybacks and write-offs are more suited to lower quality firms.”); Darian M.
Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (“IPOs are the gold
standard in VC success.”); see also PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CYCLE 7–8 (2nd ed. 2004).
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fact, pulled LSE-listed companies to it.111 This is a form of success, but
not the type that mimics Silicon Valley.
Further, while the decrease in companies listing on the AIM noted
above is partially attributable to global economic downturn in the late
2000s,112 the AIM has its share of homemade troubles. The AIM’s
regulators have been charged with insufficient monitoring of Nomads
and permitting them to have unchecked conflicts of interest.113 Nomads
are able to act as both Nomads and brokers—two roles that can have
conflicting motives.114 The fact that Nomads are hired and paid by their
client companies adds another moral complexity to the Nomads role as
gatekeeper.115
Also, few disciplinary actions or fines have been brought against
poor-performing Nomads, thus undercutting the reputational capital they
seek to impart to listed companies.116 Further, while “light-touch”
regulation reduces transaction costs for companies seeking capital, it
leaves investors open to potential fraud.117

111. See Michael Potter, Explaining the Continued Rise of London’s Alternative Investment Market (May
20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648835 (“[O]nly
111 companies have moved from the AIM to the LSE compared with 231 moving in the opposite direction.”).
112. David Blackwell & Brooke Masters, AIM Listings Fall off a Precipice, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 20, 2008, at 23.
113. Ben Turney, Does the London Stock Exchange Deserve its License to Regulate AIM, UK
INV’R MAG., July 2015, at 26–27 (on file with author).
114. See Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, Does the Alternative Investment Market Nurture
Firm Growth? A Comparison between Listed and Private Companies, 22 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
953, 959 (2013) [hereinafter Revest & Sapio, Alternative Investment Market].
115. Kevin Campbell & Isaac T. Tabner, Bonding and the Agency Risk Premium: An Analysis of
Migrations Between the AIM and the Official List of the London Stock Exchange, 30 J. INT’L FIN.
MKTS., INSTS. & MONEY 1, 6 (2014).
116. Joseph Gerakos, Mark Lang & Mark Maffett, Post-Listing Performance and Private Sector
Regulation: The Experience of London’s Alternative Investment Market, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 189,
213 (2013); Rousseau, supra note 92, at 98–99 (explaining the potential civil liability for Nomads);
see also Revest & Sapio, Alternative Investment Market, supra note 114, at 959 (stating that the
only real constraint on Nomads to act appropriately is the threat to one’s reputation for immoral
dealing).
117. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 285 (“The most caustic critics contend that investors in AIM can
be easily manipulated and even defrauded, given its sub-optimal disclosure and corporate
governance standards.”); see also Davidoff, supra note 91, at 112 (“The AIM in particular is a
controversial market. It has come under criticism for low returns, high volatility, illiquidity, and
scandalous practices by its listed issuers.”); id. at 149 (noting commentators view AIM as
“primarily a product of managerial opportunism or a simple inability of the issuer to meet the
standards of more highly regulated markets”); AIM Stock Market “Like a Casino,” BBC NEWS
(Mar. 9, 2007, 10:08), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6433637.stm [https://perma.cc/F6N7TYXY] (quoting former SEC commissioner comparing the AIM to a casino).

11 - Ibrahim (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 5:59 PM

1156

[Vol. 94:1137

B.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Germany’s Neuer Markt (NM)

Germany established the (now defunct) Neuer Markt (NM) as a
subsidiary of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 1997.118 Unlike the “lighttouch” regulation of the AIM, the NM imposed very strict disclosure and
listing requirements on its companies.119 These disclosures included
quarterly financial reporting that complied with either U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or International Accounting
Standards (IAS).120 These quarterly reports had to be published in both
English and German, to increase transparency.121 “Before the Neuer
Markt was launched in 1997, quarterly reporting of results was unheard
of.”122 Furthermore, NM issuers had to file prospectuses that detailed
“information concerning sources and application of funds, affiliated
enterprises, profits, losses and dividends per share, and information
about risk factors.”123 These requirements are akin to the disclosure
requirements applicable to large, public companies in the United States.
For example, compare the NM’s strict disclosure requirements with
the AIM, discussed above. The AIM only requires companies to
“prepare a semi-annual report, containing a balance sheet, income and
cash flow statements, and comparative figures for the corresponding
period in the previous year,” plus annual audited financials (with a sixmonth grace period from years’ end).124 The NM disclosures took Louis
Brandeis’s famous saying that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants” to the extreme.125 But while this may be thought to work

118. Audretsch & Elston, supra note 74, at 12–13 (“A special feature of the Neuer Markt was the
high concentration of startups in high technology sectors. These high-tech sectors include
Biotechnology, Financial Services, Industrials & Industrial Services, Internet, Information
Technologies, Media & Entertainment, Medical Services & Health Care, Software, and
Telecommunications.”).
119. Audrestch & Elston, supra note 74, at 15 (“Admission and reporting requirements for Neuer
Markt listed firms are more stringent than the rules for the first . . . [or] second . . . segments of the
Frankfurt exchange.”); Audretsch & Lehmann, supra note 10, at 420 (Neuer Markt features “were
designed to meet the needs of institutional investors in small, young, and high-growth firms and in
particular to gain investors’ trust. Thus, the listing guidelines were even higher than those for an
admission to the Official Trading.” (citations omitted)).
120. Audretsch & Lehmann, supra note 10, at 420–21.
121. See Audretsch & Elston, supra note 74, at 15.
122. Silvia Ascarelli & G. Thomas Sims, German Exchange Unplugs Neuer Markt—Planned
Closure Symbolizes End of Europe’s Tech Craze; Its Equity Culture, Too?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,
2002, at A12.
123. Audretsch & Lehmann, supra note 10, at 421.
124. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 311.
125. See Oranburg, supra note 49, at 1019.
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for U.S. public markets,126 disclosure can only do so much in the context
of nascent startups with unproven technologies and inexperienced
managerial teams.
Further, on the NM, each listed company was required to have “at
least two designed sponsors which were responsible for guaranteeing
liquidity and tradability of the shares” and compliance with the financial
reporting requirements.127 The designated sponsors had to agree to act in
that capacity for the listing company for at least twelve months.128
During the trading period, the designated sponsors needed to always be
available for contact.129 This resembles the Nomad function on the AIM,
but rather than standing alone as a reputational-intermediary based
system, designated sponsors merely layered on top of the NM’s stringent
disclosure requirements.
Created near the peak of the Internet’s dot.com bubble in the late
1990s, the NM “quickly grew from 2 to 343 firms.”130 It was hailed as
“helping not just to create a new type of firm that otherwise might not
exist, but also to transform the sources of innovation and growth in the
German economy.”131 Supporters anticipated that the NM would provide
stable financing for small and medium sized companies, including new
companies and those in “high-risk new technologies.”132 The stringent
disclosure requirements were anticipated to increase confidence through
transparency.133 According to the Wall Street Journal: “the access to
capital that [the NM] provided for German startups was supposed to
unleash a German equity culture to rival the U.S.”134
The NM’s fall was as swift as its rise. Due to exclusive catering to
technology startups, the NM suffered particularly hard when the
dot--com bubble burst in the late 1990s and early 2000s.135 But the NM’s
126. See Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 47, at 674–76, 691–92 (discussing the
“bonding” argument that foreign firms list their securities in the U.S. because the stringent SEC
disclosure rules and enforcement mechanisms in the U.S. signal quality).
127. Audretsch & Lehmann, supra note 10, at 421.
128. Christoph F. Vaupel & Laurenz Uhl, Listing on the Neuer Markt, 15 BUTTERWORTHS J.
INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 424, 427–28 (Nov. 2000).
129. Id. at 428.
130. Audretsch & Elston, supra note 74, at 12.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Audretsch & Lehmann, supra note 10, at 420.
133. See Sell, supra note 73, at 193.
134. Brian M. Carney, Teutonic Tailspin: A German Market’s Rise and Fall, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,
2002, at A20.
135. Sell, supra note 73, at 193 (attributing NM’s failure to the “bursting of the ‘tech bubble,’ the
bankruptcies of a number of listed firms, and several insider trading prosecutions”); see also
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problems ran much deeper. First, the listed companies were plagued by
fraud despite “heavy-touch” regulation and sponsor requirements. The
first company listed on NM, MobilCom, saw its shares enjoy a
significant “rise at its peak, but [they] have since lost nearly all their
value,” in part due to a “self-dealing scandal involving [the founder’s]
wife’s investment vehicle.”136 Another NM company, Comroad, went
public in 1999, but in April 2002 “it was revealed that nearly all of the
company’s $94 million in reported revenue for 2001 was fictitious.”137
Second, the NM’s investor base was not sophisticated like the AIM’s.
Instead, NM investors were described as being “like the dot-com
speculators in the U.S., mostly a young crowd . . . [looking for] easy
money.”138 One study found that 42% of the NM’s IPOs were backed by
sophisticated institutional investors.139 However, NM’s structure, such as
a six-month lock up period, made investing in NM-listed issuers less
palatable for VCs.140 Nor were the NM’s regulators adequate at policing
the fraud and protecting investors.141 According to one commentator, the
NM failed due to “an apparent lack of sophistication of both investors
and regulatory authorities.”142
The first domino to fall in NM’s collapse was the announcement in
early 2000 by several listed companies that they would fail to meet their
initial forecasts.143 In September of 2000, the first of the NM
bankruptcies was announced, quickly followed by several others.144
Prompted by this turmoil, NM’s parent company issued an
announcement that penny-stocks and insolvent companies would be
Davidoff, supra note 91, at 144 (“[T]he popping of the technology bubble resulted in a ninety
percent decline in aggregate market capitalization on the Neuer Markt in just one year, from 2001 to
2002.”).
136. Carney, supra note 134, at A20.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Tereza Tykova, Who Are the True Venture Capitalists in Germany? 2–3 (Ctr. for European
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 04-16, 2004).
140. See Wolfgang Bessler & Andreas Kurth, Exit Strategies of Venture Capitalists in Hot Issue
Markets: Evidence from the “Neuer Markt” in Germany, 10 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. & BUS.
VENTURES 17, 18 (2005).
141. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?, supra note 47, at 1805–06 (citation omitted) (“Observers
report that many of the scandals plaguing the Neuer Markt were the product of a shortfall in
deterrence attributable to the lack of enforcement of insider trading restrictions in Germany. In this
light, there may be outer limits on the ability of bonding to work, which are set by the strength of
the legal protections in the jurisdiction of listing.”).
142. Mendoza, supra note 79, at 293.
143. Audretsch & Lehmann, supra note 10, at 421.
144. Id.
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removed from the NM in October 2001.145 By the end of 2002, “more
[than] one third of all listed companies[] had left the NM,”146 and the
NM had “plunged 95% from its all-time high 2 1/2 years [prior], reached
at the peak of the Internet bubble.”147 The NM was shut down that same
year—a five-year run start to finish.148 What had once been the hope of
revitalizing the German technological sector is now a cautionary tale for
other growth stock exchanges.149
C.

Hong Kong’s Growth Enterprise Market (GEM)

Asian nations have attempted their own junior stock exchanges.150
Among these, Hong Kong’s Growth Enterprise Market (or GEM) was
launched in late 1999 to form a “venture board for smaller and emerging
technology companies’ stocks.”151 In a hybrid approach to the AIM and
NM models, the GEM would have less stringent listing requirements
than the main Hong Kong stock exchange (AIM-like), but an “enhanced
disclosure based regime” (NM-like).152
To list on the GEM, companies must have a cash flow of HK$30
million, a minimum expected market capitalization of HK$150 million,
and a minimum public float at time of listing of HK$45 million.153 In
terms of disclosure, the GEM was intended to operate an “enhanced

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Ascarelli & Sims, supra note 122, at A12.
148. Audretsch & Lehmann, supra note 10, at 420 (“The dramatic number of delistings due to
fraud and insolvencies . . . led the Deutsche Boerse AG to terminate the Neuer Markt in 2003.”);
Revest & Sapio, Financing Technology-Based Small Firms, supra note 67, at 13 (describing the
Neuer Markt as a “notable failure[]”).
149. See Carney, supra note 134, at A20.
150. Austin, supra note 92, at 26–27 (explaining the market for startups in Korea); Jarunee
Wonglimpiyarat, Equity Financing and Capital Market Funding Policies to Support
Entrepreneurial Development in Asia: Comparative Cases of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Taiwan, 15 J. PRIV. EQUITY 10, 18 (2012); Overview of Market System, JAPAN EXCHANGE GROUP,
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing-on-tse/new/guide/tvdivq0000002g9batt/b5b4pj000000ok3f.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGS4-NGR9]; see also Consultation Paper, supra note
78, at 20–22 (discussing Asian attempts at junior stock exchanges).
151. Consultation Paper, supra note 78, at 20; Hui Hu & Milind Sathye, Predicting Financial Distress in
the Hong Kong Growth Enterprises Market From the Perspective of Financial Sustainability, 7
SUSTAINABILITY 1186, 1187 (2015) (“[T]echnology companies dominate the GEM . . . .”).
152. Consultation Paper, supra note 78, at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. See Amendments to HKEx’s Main Board and GEM Listing Rules Take Effect on 15
February 2018, NEWSLETTER (Charltons Solicitors, Hong Kong), Dec. 19, 2017, at 1,
https://www.charltonslaw.com/amendments-to-hkex-main-board-and-gem-listing-rules-take-effecton-15-february-2018/ [https://perma.cc/68Z2-VGZ].
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disclosure based regime with prominent ‘buyer beware risk warnings in
listing documents.’”154 As part of the prospectus-type listing document,
applicants have to provide financial statements for at least the prior two
years as part of their GEM listing document.155 In addition, GEM
Transfer Applicants (companies that have been listed on the GEM and
not subject to disciplinary action for at least two and wish to transfer to
the Hong Kong’s main exchange) are required to have a sponsor.156 The
GEM also required that new applicants to the GEM appoint a sponsor,
which serve a similar function to Nomads on the AIM and designated
sponsors on the NM.157 However, litigation against poor-performing
sponsors is rare.158
The GEM’s outcome, like its structure, is somewhat of a hybrid
between the AIM and NM. Taking a look back in time, after the dot.com
bust of the early 2000s, “many GEM issuers experienced a decline in
their share prices and some experienced losses and/or long periods of
suspension and their shares were often illiquid.”159 As a result, investors
and companies lost confidence in GEM.160 This spurred an internal
review of the structure of GEM, with consideration of a plan to create a
new market and leave the old exchange behind.161 Instead, the Hong
Kong main exchange decided to overhaul the listing rules.162 As a result,
the GEM underwent major revisions in both 2008 and 2018.
First, in 2008, after years of companies moving from Hong Kong’s
main stock exchange (the Main Board) to the GEM rather than vice
versa,163similar to the AIM,164 Hong Kong sought to reposition the GEM
154. Consultation Paper, supra note 78, at 20.
155. Id. at 9, 31.
156. Id. at 9.
157. Chapter 6A: Sponsors and Compliance Advisers, H.K. EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD.
6A.02 (July 6, 2019), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/Listing/Rules-andGuidance/Listing-Rules-Contingency/GEM-Listing-Rules/General/chapter_6a.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/CZF5-QPVZ] (“A new applicant must appoint a Sponsor under a written
engagement agreement to assist it with its initial application for listing.”).
158. Hu & Sathye, supra note 151, at 1196 (“Hong Kong has been described as one of the least
litigious regions in the world. The lack of litigiousness severely restricts the ability of investors to
bring lawsuits against auditors for alleged ‘audit failures.’ Apart from the legal barriers, the
prevalence of Confucianism in Hong Kong has led to a culture of settling differences using
negotiation instead of the formal legal system.”).
159. Consultation Paper, supra note 78, at 20.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id. at Appendix II, 6–7.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 21.
164. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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more explicitly as a “stepping stone” to the Main Board.165 The 2008
changes streamlined the listing process and focused on helping small and
medium companies enter the Hong Kong capital markets.166 The 2008
changes were successful in revitalizing the GEM and bringing back
some of the confidence lost during the early 2000s.167
Second, still lacking notable upward movement of companies from
the GEM to the Hong Kong senior exchange,168 GEM’s rules were
revised again in 2018.169 The new revisions reimagined GEM as its own
self-sufficient exchange, not as a stepping stone to a more senior
exchange.170 In addition to the lack of upward movement, there were
concerns about the companies that did transfer from the GEM to the
Main Board. Criticisms of these companies focused on the need for more
due diligence and transparency about these companies’ operations.171
Thus, while the GEM’s future is uncertain, its goal has evolved from
providing a space for startups to mature before seeking placement on
Hong Kong’s main exchange.172
III. PRIVATE VENTURE CAPITAL: THE UNITED STATES
Thus far, junior stock exchanges have been unable to replicate the
United States’ success with private venture capital. The AIM’s
“light-touch” regulation may be attractive to startups, but investor
protection suffers without an adequate substitute. Too much weight is
put on reputational intermediaries. Conversely, the NM’s strict
disclosure rules did not solve the problem, likely because firms had too
little to disclosure and what disclosure was provided was not adequately
165. Consultation Paper, supra note 78, at 9 (noting the “limited success of the ‘stepping stone’
positioning” of the GEM); Hu & Sathye, supra note 151, at 1189 (“[T]he GEM provides a fundraising venue and an exit ground, especially for high-growth and high-risk enterprises.”).
166. Consultation Paper, supra note 78, at 21.
167. Id.
168. See He, supra note 10 (quoting a Credit Suisse researcher as stating that “the GEM has filed
in its original mission to become a thriving Nasdaq-style stock exchange,” and that “[n]ot many
investors want to trade here[;] [i]n contrast, it has attracted a lot of speculators”).
169. Enoch Yiu, HKEX Unveils Tougher Listing Rules, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 16,
2017, at 3.
170. Id.
171. Consultation Paper, supra note 78, at 9.
172. See Enoch Yiu, GEM Poised to Lose its Lustre as Listing Reforms Kick In, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 30, 2018, at 4 (“Among other changes, GEM is no longer to be a pathway to a
main board listing.”); see generally He, supra note 10 (concluding that the “high aspirations the
GEM would become a magnate for Asian technology startups . . . . hasn’t quite worked out that
way”).
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policed for its veracity. The GEM’s hybrid approach has likewise proven
unsuccessful at fostering startup growth for eventual listing on a major
exchange.
The private system of venture capital found in the United States
handles the extreme information asymmetry and agency costs present in
startup investing differently than a junior stock exchange.173 There is far
less reliance on public solutions, namely corporate and securities law,
even with the United States supplying both in spades.
First, private startups do not have to issue disclosures to the public on
a periodic basis as public companies do. Even when selling securities to
investors, these sales also require no disclosure to most investors who
buy startup stock.174 This is because, to ease the transaction costs of
selling securities to wealthy, sophisticated investors, the SEC adopted
Regulation D and specifically Rule 506.175 Under Rule 506, sales to
“accredited investors,”176 including angel investors,177 require no specific
disclosures under the theory that such investors can fend for
themselves.178 While there are other exemptions (including Rules 504179
173. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1078 (“[M]ultiple forms of incentive and monitoring
techniques, including contractual, control, and market mechanisms, operate in connection with each
contracting node to resolve the problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
associated with early stage, high technology financing.”).
174. Thomas Murphy, Playing to a New Crowd: How Congress Could Break the Startup Status
Quo by Raising the Cap on the JOBS Act’s Crowdfunding Exemption, 58 B.C. L. REV. 775, 797
(2017) (“[S[tartup financing has traditionally been dominated by angel investors and venture
capitalists, both of which fall under the existing Securities Act exemptions . . . .”).
175. Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism, and the Dynamics of
Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 229–35, 285–89 (1990).
176. Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 3, at 1444 (“[S]ome angel groups require only that
members be accredited investors.”); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2019); Interpretative Release on
Regulation D, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045 (Mar. 10, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 231) (“[I]f
accredited investors are the only purchasers in offerings under Rule[] . . . 506, Regulation D does
not require delivery of specific disclosure . . . .”); Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the
Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 73–74 (1998) (noting that
the old ACE-Net online system developed by the Small Business Administration to match angels
and entrepreneurs required the angels to be accredited investors).
177. Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 3, at 1406 (“Angel investors are wealthy individuals
who personally finance the same high-risk, high-growth start-ups as venture capitalists but at an
earlier stage. Well-known angels include Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, EDS founder H. Ross
Perot, and Dallas Mavericks’ owner Mark Cuban.”)
178. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 571 (“[M]ost Rule 506 offerings, and
virtually all startups’ sales to angels and VCs, are limited to accredited investors due to the
disclosure and other requirements involved when bringing unaccredited investors into the mix.”);
Fan, supra note 2, at 592 (“The theory behind Regulation D is that accredited investors are
financially sophisticated and therefore do not need all the protections of the securities laws.”); see
also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2019).

11 - Ibrahim (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

PUBLIC OR PRIVATE VENTURE CAPITAL?

10/21/2019 5:59 PM

1163

and Section 3(a)(11)180) for private company sales of securities, Rule
506 is the startup’s most commonly-used exemption.181 Therefore, in
contrast to publicly-supplied venture capital, mandatory disclosures are
not the mechanism by which private venture capital attempts to mitigate
information asymmetry.
Second, as an agency-cost reducing mechanism, like in public
companies, entrepreneurs who control the startup’s board of directors
owe angels and VCs fiduciary duties under state corporate law.182
However, VCs rarely sue entrepreneurs absent special circumstances or
outright theft.183 Instead, as discussed in the next sections, the U.S.
system of private venture capital uses private ordering and informal
means to reduce both information asymmetry and agency costs in startup
investing.
A.

Reducing Information Asymmetry Through Private Ordering or
Informal Means

Angels and VCs are the primary sources of private venture capital to
startups in the United States. These investors take big risks, but they are
skilled in startup investing and can reap big rewards. Eschewing
mandatory disclosure, angels and VCs reduce information asymmetry
through private ordering and informal, reputational-based means.184
VCs, and more sophisticated angels, use detailed investment contracts to
180. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
181. Abraham J. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage
Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 132 (2010) (“The exemption from registration that most
startup companies rely on is Rule 506 of Regulation D . . . .”); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The
Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Consequences for the SEC’s Crown Jewel
Exemptions, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 287, 295 (2012) (“Regulation D offerings
overwhelmingly are made under Rule 506. Even offerings of one million dollars or less—offerings
that are suited for Rule 504—are overwhelmingly made under Rule 506. Similarly, the data show
offerings of one million to five million dollars—offerings that are suited for Rule 505—are also
overwhelmingly made under Rule 506.”).
182. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345,
360 (Del. 1993).
183. See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 570–71 (1991); John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky,
Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 307–08 (2013) (finding that in any litigation that did occur,
entrepreneurs were always plaintiffs). But see Equity-Linked Inv’rs., L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040
(Del. Ch. 1997) (involving an industrial investor suing a board, including company’s founder, to
stop a new financing deal).
184. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1069 (“[T]he keystone of the U.S. venture capital
market is private ordering—the contracting structure that developed to manage the extreme
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs that inevitably bedevil early-stage, hightechnology financing.”).
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reduce information asymmetries with entrepreneurs.185 Most notably,
VCs have long contracted for “staged financing,” or financing a startup
in chunks over time instead of all at once.186 Staged financing reduces
information asymmetry directly by allowing VCs to gather, process, and
verify more information about startups between each stage of
financing.187 While public venture capital could replicate staged
financing in theory, in practice staged financing is orderly, tight-knit (in
terms of investor identity), and at logical intervals,188 not sporadic like
raising money with attendant secondary trading on a public exchange.
Staged financing also reduces information asymmetry indirectly by
allowing entrepreneurs to signal their quality by agreeing to less than all
the financing up front.189 A low quality entrepreneur might want all
financing up front in case their performance then lagged. Entrepreneurs
also grant angel groups and VCs preferred stock as opposed to the
entrepreneur’s common stock.190 Preferred stock is paid first, thereby
signaling the entrepreneur’s confidence that the startup’s value will
exceed the extent of the angel or VC preferences.191 It is unlikely that

185. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, supra note 66, at 742–48 (discussing the more
formal, professional angel groups and their similarity to VCs).
186. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1073 (“The initial venture capital investment usually
will be insufficient to fund the portfolio company’s entire business plan. Accordingly, investment
will be ‘staged.’ A particular investment round will provide only the capital the business plan
projects as necessary to achieve specified milestones set out in the business plan.”); Steven N.
Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 304 (2003).
187. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1081 (“By accepting a contractual structure that
imposes significant penalties if the entrepreneur fails to meet [sic] specified milestones based on the
business plan’s projections—the venture capital fund’s option to abandon then becomes
exercisable—the entrepreneur makes those projections credible.”); id. at 1079 (“Even if the venture
capital fund chooses to continue the portfolio company’s project by providing another round of
financing, a performance penalty still can be imposed by assigning the portfolio company a lower
value in the new round.”).
188. Spencer Williams, Venture Capital Contract Design: An Empirical Analysis of the
Connection Between Bargaining Power and Venture Capital Contract Terms, 23 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 105, 135 (2017) (“The different stages can be separated by time (with investors
having the option to invest more at each stage) or can be tied to the achievement of specific
technological or business milestones.”).
189. See Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Signals, supra note 62, at 209–10; Gilson, Engineering, supra
note 14, at 1080 (“Because the incentive created by staged financing is more valuable to a good
entrepreneur than a bad one, an entrepreneur’s willingness to accept an intense incentive is a signal
of the entrepreneur’s difficult-to-observe skills.”).
190. See generally Fried & Ganor, supra note 29 (discussing the resulting agency costs that may
arise for entrepreneurs from this setup).
191. Otherwise the entrepreneur receives nothing. See Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Signals, supra note
61, at 210.
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public investors could negotiate the bells and whistles of preferred stock
due to collective action problems.192
However, in liquidation or other defined exit events, most individual
angel investors, forego the contract-based approach, relying instead on
informal mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry.193 Both angel
and VC investing are characterized by an intense geographic
component.194 Both angels and VCs invest locally where they live and
work. Sometimes the investors have had prior dealings with an
entrepreneur.195 Without prior first-hand knowledge of an entrepreneur,
investors use a “network of trust”—business associates, lawyers, even
fellow investors—to find promising investments in their areas.196 The
knowledge and experiences of a trusted referrer can substitute for the
investor’s lack of prior dealings with an entrepreneur.
Further, angels and some VCs invest in high-tech fields in which they
have special expertise.197 Many angels are ex-entrepreneurs who
successfully cashed-out of a tech startup before becoming investors, and
they may be interested in leveraging their expertise and experience in
selecting target companies.198 Informal mechanisms and private ordering

192. See Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Signals, supra note 61, at 230.
193. This is not the case for angel groups, which more closely resemble early-stage VCs than
traditional angels in their practices. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, supra note 66, at
743 (“Angel groups are professionalizing the practice of angel investing.”).
194. See Stephen Prowse, Angel Investors and the Market for Angel Investments, 22 J. BANKING
& FIN. 785, 789 n.5 (1998) (noting angels’ preference for local investments); Schwartz, Digital
Shareholder, supra note 37, at 622 (“[T]here is tremendous competition for [angel and VC]
investments and such investors are interested in certain types of companies, often in limited
geographic areas. Importantly, angels and VCs rely heavily on connections, making it difficult to
get funded in the absence of pre-existing relationships with such investors or their acquaintances.”).
195. Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 3, at 1431 (“Angel investing is highly localized,
relationship-driven, and industry-specific.”).
196. See Prowse, supra note 192, at 789 (“The primary criterion that angels use to screen
proposals is whether the entrepreneur is previously known and trusted by them or by an associate
who they trust.”); Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, supra note 68, at 905–06
(“Unfortunately, entrepreneurs who are ‘out of the loop’ for one reason or another appear to have a
difficult time getting startup financing.”); Mark C. Suchman, Dealmakers and Counselors: Law
Firms as Intermediaries in the Development of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON
VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 71, 7980 (Martin Kenney ed., 2000)
(discussing the matchmaker role Silicon Valley lawyers play between entrepreneurs and investors).
197. Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 3, at 1431–32 (“Angels like to invest in start-ups where
they know either entrepreneur or the substantive area . . . and preferably both. This preexisting
knowledge . . . reduces information asymmetry by minimizing the entrepreneur’s advantage of
private information.”); see Teresa Hogan et al., Drivers of External Equity Funding in Small HighTech Ventures, J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 236, 239 (2017).
198. MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING: MATCHING STARTUP FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES—THE GUIDE FOR ENTREPRENEURS, INDIVIDUAL
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are substitutes to mandatory disclosure for mitigating information
asymmetries in startup investing, and seem to work much better.
B.

Reducing Agency Costs Through Private Ordering and Informal
Means

Once investors decide to invest in a startup, their focus turns from
reducing information asymmetry to reducing agency costs. In short,
angels and VCs must monitor their investments to ensure they are put to
good use, favoring not only the entrepreneur but the VCs too. As in preinvestment diligence, angels and VCs rely on private ordering and
informal tools to reduce agency costs, foregoing the public law solution
of suing for breach of fiduciary duty under generalized corporate law.
The VCs staged financing tool discussed above not only reduces
information asymmetry; it also reduces agency costs by aligning the
entrepreneur’s incentives with the VC’s.199 The entrepreneur must
produce value for the VC to receive further financing. 200 Further, the
entrepreneur is motivated to please the VC to continue to receive the
VC’s value-added services, including advice and connections.201 Should
a VC become disenchanted with an entrepreneur and forego the next
round of financing, it sends a negative signal to other VCs, thus
minimizing the entrepreneur’s likelihood of receiving funds from other
investors.202
INVESTORS, AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 108 (2000) (stating that 75% to 83% of angel investors
have prior entrepreneurial experience).
199. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1080 (“Because of the option-like character of the
entrepreneur’s interest in the portfolio company, she will go forward with the project under
conditions that favor her and disfavor the venture capital fund. Shifting this decision to the venture
capital fund reduces this source of agency cost.”).
200. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 323–24
(2005) (“[The VC’s] threat of abandonment, coupled with the prospect of dilution to the
entrepreneur from repeated outside investments, mitigates the entrepreneur’s holdup incentive . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
201. Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 254 (“A venture capitalist can choose not to make or return
telephone calls to or from a portfolio company or its suppliers, customers, or prospective
employees. The fund’s power to withhold its management assistance and reputational capital
reinforces its incentive and power to monitor.”); Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 110, at 874
(“There is ample evidence that early-stage and high-tech ventures receive more advice and intensive
monitoring than their late-stage counterparts, and high-risk projects receive significantly more
advice.”).
202. Further contractual provisions such as board seats and negative covenants further reduce
agency costs between staged financing rounds. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1082
(“[G]iving the venture capital fund disproportionate representation or even control of the portfolio
company’s board of directors, and the restriction of the entrepreneur’s discretion through the use of
negative covenants, gives the fund interim control—the power to act to reduce agency costs in the
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Informally, local investing allows hands-on monitoring in a way that
public investing through a junior stock exchanges does not. Investors
can regularly visit a startup’s offices, attend board meetings in person,203
and chat informally over coffee as occasion arises.204 While large
investors in public companies may take advantage of closer-than-normal
contact with chief executive officers (CEOs), angels, and VCs are
known to develop more personal, intense relationships with
entrepreneurs than typically found in the public investor-CEO context.
Intense geographic concentration of investments also creates a reputation
market where all players in entrepreneurial finance are known to each
other.205 Should entrepreneurs act opportunistically toward a VC, other
VCs will learn about it and blacklist the entrepreneur going forward.206
Entrepreneurs are concerned with this possibility given the need for
follow-on funding for the current venture and the need to seek capital
from the same community of investors for subsequent ventures.
The U.S. private venture capital system has been highly effective, and
it is one of the “crown jewels of the American economy.”207 The U.S.
venture capital system has created numerous new public companies208
period between financing rounds.”); id. at 1079 (“[P]otential investors know they are being solicited
only because investors in the prior round are dissatisfied with the portfolio company’s
performance.”); Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 253 (“[VCs] receive strong control levers,
disproportionate to the size of their equity investment.”).
203. VCs usually take board seats. Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in
Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 461, 468 (2010) (“Board seats in VC-backed firms are typically
allocated on a class-specific basis as specified in the financing documents. This makes it possible to
classify each director into one of three categories: (1) VC, (2) entrepreneur, or (3) independent
director.”).
204. Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 3, at 1433; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1757 (2001)
(“Where trust can be harnessed, it can substantially reduce the inefficiencies associated with both agency
and team production relationships. Trust permits transactions to go forward on the basis of a handshake
rather than a complex formal contract . . . and it avoids the uncertainty and expense associated with trying to
enforce formal and informal agreements in the courts.”).
205. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1085–87 (discussing the reputation market).
206. See Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 262–63 (arguing that reputational constraints imposed
by geographic proximity between VCs and entrepreneurs check the potential for VC opportunism);
Smith, supra note 200, at 320.
207. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1068.
208. In 2016, more than 7,750 companies were venture-backed and received $69.1 billion in
funding. 2017 NVCA Yearbook Highlights Busy Year for Venture Industry and NVCA, NAT’L
VENTURE CAP. ASS’N (Mar. 6, 2017), https://nvca.org/pressreleases/2017-nvca-yearbookhighlights-busy-year-venture-industry-nvca/ [https://perma.cc/R5KH-EMCZ]. Of that, 81% of the
companies (6,600 companies) and 44% of the venture dollars ($30.7 billion) were for angel/seed
and early stage VC investments. Id. In 2017, a total of $85 billion in funding went to more than
8,000 venture-backed companies. NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, NVCA 2018 YEARBOOK 5 (2018).
Only 47% of VC investments (fewer than 3,900) were angel/seed investments in 2018. Id. at 6.
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and millions of new jobs,209 and it brings cutting-edge science to the
marketplace.210 While there are many historical reasons for the U.S.
success,211 investors’ ability to reduce information asymmetry and
agency costs through private ordering and informal means keeps the
system alive and well.212
IV. THE U.S. MOVE TO CROWDFUNDING: A CURIOUS CASE
AND FORTUITOUS TURN
Given the success of the U.S. private venture capital system, coupled
with the failure of foreign public venture capital to accomplish the same
goals, the recent U.S. infatuation with crowdfunding presents something
of a mystery. Crowdfunding is loosely defined as a startup raising
money over the Internet from a large number of investors, including
people who may not be regular investors.213 Equity crowdfunding
implicates the U.S. securities laws, whereas rewards or donation-based
crowdfunding does not.214
Legalizing crowdfunding was a key goal of the JOBS Act.215 As this
Part discusses, crowdfunding’s original design had a de facto
resemblance to a junior stock exchange.216 And like junior stock
209. Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, The Economic Impact of Venture Capital: Evidence from
Public Companies 6–8 (Stanford Graduate School of Business Working Paper No. 3362, 2015),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/economic-impact-venture-capitalevidence-public-companies [https://perma.cc/9D3Z-PTEL] (stating roughly four million more
people were employed by venture capital-backed public companies in 2014 than in 1974); NAT’L
VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, NVCA 2018 YEARBOOK DATA PACK PUBLIC VERSION 29,
https://nvca.org/download/67354/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (noting 832 of the 3,377 IPOs in the
United States from 2004 through 2017 were backed by venture capital).
210. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 14, at 1077 (“Research and development by large
companies with access to the public capital markets simply is not a substitute for the activities of
early stage companies, financed through the private equity market . . . .”).
211. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
212. See Bottazzi & Da Rin, supra note 67, at 14 (“Venture capital is the typical source of
financial muscle for American entrepreneurial firms.”); Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley,
supra note 66, at 733, 749–51 (“Private venture capital backed the Internet revolution of the 1990s
and is now a driving force behind innovation in clea[n] technology alternatives to fossil fuels.”).
213. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 567.
214. Id. at 569.
215. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 306, 315–
23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
216. Funding portals, the hosts of crowdfunding offerings, are not technically exchanges,
however; their main concern is becoming broker-dealers. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388,
71,460–61 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274)
(funding portals not required to register as broker-dealers if they do not offer investment advice,
hold funds, etc.).
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exchanges that opened up capital markets for entrepreneurs and
investment opportunities for investors, crowdfunding’s goals included
broadening access to capital for U.S. entrepreneurs and democratizing
startup investing by allowing ordinary investors to participate in
offerings previously reserved for angels and VCs.217 The previous U.S.
private placement exemptions, including the often-used Rule 506
discussed earlier, exclude unaccredited investors absent significant
disclosure.218 But per crowdfunding proponents, why should Silicon
Valley investors and entrepreneurs be the only ones who reap the big
rewards?219 And why not give more startups the funds to serve as a
stepping stone to a successful exit via IPO or trade sale? On the other
hand, as discussed in the previous Part, junior stock exchanges have not
been successful at supplying growth capital to young companies or large
returns to risk-prone investors. Therefore, that crowdfunding—located in
the heart of private venture capital country—would instead resemble a
foreign junior stock exchange is curious.
A.

U.S. Crowdfunding Designed as Public Venture Capital

Crowdfunding in its original form, as set forth in Title III of the JOBS
Act in 2012, did not resemble the successful angel and VC approach that
preceded it.220 Instead of tracking Rule 506, crowdfunding more closely
resembled the junior stock exchange approach found abroad in that
anyone could invest and disclosure was required.221 Per Title III, startups
seeking funds from the “crowd” list investment opportunities on
“funding portals,” which are simply websites such as WeFunder and
SeedInvest that post the startups seeking capital, the terms of investment,
217. Jean Eaglesham, Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at C1
(quoting President Obama as calling crowdfunding a “game changer” that allows “ordinary
Americans . . . to go online and invest in entrepreneurs they believe in”); Andrew A. Schwartz,
Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661, 662 (2016) (“Inclusivity is core to the nature of
crowdfunding as a distinct form of capital raising.”); Mark Hiraide, Ready Capital, L.A. LAW., Dec.
2016, at 18 (“Many hail the JOBS Act . . . as allowing everyday people to invest in an asset class
previously reserved for venture capitalists.”); Seth C. Oranburg, Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and
the Market for Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 404 (2015) (“While
the angels and VCs currently provide the vast majority of traditional startup investment, the JOBS
Act may allow a new type of investor to enter the marketplace: the general public.”).
218. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text; see also Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding,
supra note 3, at 572.
219. See Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, supra note 68, at 905–06.
220. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 566 (“Due to Title III’s [of the JOBS Act]
extreme departure from traditional entrepreneurial finance, there is a significant risk that it will
fail . . . .”).
221. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 572, 593–94.
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and so forth.222 Subject only to some initial checks into the criminal
histories of entrepreneurs, funding portals had to list crowdfunding
opportunities for any startups that wanted to use the funding portal’s
services.223 Further, anyone—including unaccredited, unsophisticated
investors—could invest, subject to certain limits.224 The funding portal
thus looks, on initial blush, like a junior stock exchange.225 It is a
publicly available opportunity for anyone to invest in a high-risk startup.
Of the three junior stock exchanges studied in this Article, the closest
analogy to the original design of U.S. crowdfunding is the NM. While
startups seeking funds from the crowd do not have to release quarterly
financials, disclosures are still significant relative to the small amounts
being raised.226 Crowdfunding startups must disclose their business
plan,227 financials,228 use of proceeds,229 and other information similar to

222. Joan M. Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals Under the
CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 177, 190–91 (2013) (discussing the concept of a
funding portal).
223. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 604 (under Title III as originally written, “a
funding portal must basically act as a ‘neutral third party’”). But see 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5) (2012)
(requiring funding portals to “take . . . measures to reduce the risk of fraud . . . including obtaining a
background or securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, director, and person
holding more than 20 percent [of an issuer’s equity]”).
224. The limit for investing is the greater of $2,000 or 5% of annual income for investors whose
annual income is below $100,000, and the greater of $10,000 or 10% of annual income for those
investors with annual incomes above $100,000. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at
572.
225. Joan M. Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to
and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 836 (2014) (“[T]he websites through which securities are
crowdfunded serve in a role that makes them transactional intermediaries in the manner of securities
brokers or even securities exchanges, these exchanges . . . must be registered brokers or registered
funding portals, a new type of securities trading intermediary created in the CROWDFUND Act.”).
226. See Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, supra note 68, at 901 (noting that
crowdfunding startups “must provide numerous disclosures to investors, intermediaries and the
SEC”); Louis Bevilacqua, How Much Does it Cost to Raise Money Through Equity Crowdfunding?,
BEVILACQUA PLLC (Sept. 26, 2016), http://bevilacquapllc.com/much-cost-raise-money-equitycrowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/S9PA-TX83] (estimating crowdfunding disclosure costs between
$3,000 and $20,000).
227. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b)(1)(C), 126 Stat. 306,
317 (2012) (stating a startup must disclose “a description of the business of the issuer and the
anticipated business plan of the issuer”).
228. An issuer must have an independent public accountant review—and sometimes audit
depending on the target offering amount—their financial statements. 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(t)(2)–(3)
(2019). This latter requirement does not apply to first-time issuers, who can produce financial
statements done for them in the past. Id.
229. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b)(1)(E), 126 Stat. 306,
317 (2012) (startup must disclose a “description of the stated purpose and intended use of the
proceeds of the offering sought by the issuer with respect to the target offering amount”).
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what a public company is required to disclose.230 Commentators have
lamented the crowdfunding disclosure requirements as too onerous.231
But disclosure was crowdfunding’s primary means of investor
protection. As originally designed, crowdfunding did not employ an
AIM-like Nomad to sponsor startups as a gatekeeping measure.
Another resemblance to the NM is crowdfunding’s unsophisticated
investor base.232 Literally anyone with an Internet connection can buy
startup securities through a funding portal.233 By hanging its hat on
disclosure as a solution to mitigating unsophisticated investor
informational disadvantage,234 Title III situated U.S. crowdfunding
squarely in the mold of a NM-like junior stock exchange and public
venture capital. But as we saw from the NM experience, disclosure is a
crude tool for reducing the information asymmetry in this context.
B.

U.S. Crowdfunding Morphing into the Private Model

Despite the inclusion of Title III in the 2012 JOBS Act, crowdfunding
was not implemented until 2015, after an extensive rulemaking exercise
by the SEC. The result—Regulation CF—made important changes to the
conception of funding portals. Most significantly, Regulation CF allows
funding portals to curate, or screen startups, based on their potential for

230. Christopher Mims, Crowdfunding Can Be a Gamble For Tech Startups, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
2015, at B3 (“It is all the pain of an IPO without the benefits of the IPO.”); Jack Wroldsen,
Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543, 551–52 (2017) (noting the
“extensive disclosures” Regulation CF requires).
231. Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in
Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1605 (2013) (Title III imposes “a quite
heavy and costly set of responsibilities on . . . issuers . . . .”); Eric C. Chaffee, Securities Regulation
in Virtual Space, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387, 1432 (2017) (“[T]he exemption created by the
CROWDFUND Act is so onerous to comply with that no software developer, platform owner, or
user is likely going to take the time and expense to company with it, especially considering the
required disclosures and prohibitions on resale.”); Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding
Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1444 (2012) (“Can this
new regulatory-laden exemption be useful to small entrepreneurs? It is difficult to imagine that for
offerings under $250,000 either issuers or intermediaries would be willing to undertake the time,
cost and risk of potential liabilities.”).
232. See generally Heminway, supra note 225, at 829–30 (noting that the “precise nature of
investor crowds . . . is not often expressly considered in engaging mandatory disclosure as a
regulatory tool or modifying it over time as investor profiles change”).
233. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
234. See Heminway, supra note 225, at 830, 833 (“Members of this Internet-based crowd may
have had no physical contact with the issuer or each other apart from Internet solicitations and
communications.”).
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success (in the funding portal’s discretion).235 Thus, funding portals now
serve a Nomad-like gatekeeping function. That is, if a reputable funding
portal lists a startup, investors may have some inkling that it is not a
terrible investment—that it has passed some sort of screening process.236
As I have previously argued, “[f]unding portals should also have the
incentive to curate, as a competitive reputation market among funding
portals should quickly form.”237
Funding portal curation is not enough to reduce information
asymmetry in this dangerous environment. Funding portals can—and
have the economic incentive to—only do so much.238 They are not like
Nomads in that they are not explicitly vouching for startups who list
with them.239 Further, the AIM’s use of Nomads has not vaulted small
companies to exits on the LSE,240 so just because a startup lists on a top
funding portal does not imply it will then go on to receive angel and VC
funding—the logical next step for the very early stage companies that
will likely use Regulation CF.241 Thankfully, Regulation CF went further
and allowed funding portals to permit further curation by experts once a
startup listed on the portal.242 Experts participating in crowdfunding
offerings can weigh in on a startup’s prospects on a funding portal’s
message board, or join any number of a funding portal’s “investment
clubs.”243
For example, one can visit WeFunder (a top funding portal) and
follow the investment club “Orange Hand.”244 Orange Hand is a group
235. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,462–63; Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding,
supra note 68, at 910 (“The SEC concurred that the system [of crowdfunding] would only work, or
would at least work much better, if funding portals had the power to select which companies to
include, and which to exclude, from its site.”).
236. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, supra note 68, at 911–12 (Regulation CF
“authorizes and empowers funding portals to exclude what they perceived to be low-quality
companies with poor prospects or too much risk”); Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the
Crowd, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1498 (2017).
237. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 236, at 1498–99 (emphasis in
original).
238. Id. at 1499–1500.
239. Id.
240. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
241. Because secondary markets do not exist for crowdfunded securities (at least not yet), this is
currently investors’ only means of liquidity. See Austin, supra note 92, at 22; Rahn, supra note 9, at
275.
242. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 306, 315–
23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
243. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 236, at 1500–03 (describing message
boards and investment clubs).
244. Orange Fund V, WEFUNDER https://wefunder.com/y-combinator-alumni [https://perma.cc/XDD7-XT94].
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of alumni from Y Combinator, the leading Silicon Valley accelerator.245
By investing alongside these successful individuals, unsophisticated
investors have dramatically reduced their information asymmetry. 246 In
short, unsophisticated investors are deferring to Orange Hand’s
evaluation of a startup’s prospects. It is essentially the same as an angel
investor who invests because the deal came from a trusted referrer.
The problem of potentially high agency costs after investment still
remains in U.S. crowdfunding. Fiduciary duty law seems to be a poor
tool for the small amounts involved. An investor who puts $200 into a
crowdfunding campaign is extremely unlikely to sue the entrepreneur for
breach of fiduciary duty. Discovery and litigation costs would
overwhelm the amount lost. Regulation CF also authorizes securities
fraud suits, but it is again unclear how useful that mechanism will be due
to the small amounts involved.247 Most troublesome of all, private,
hands-on monitoring aimed at preventing mismanagement is unlikely to
be implemented due to the widely dispersed nature of crowdfunding
investors.
Perhaps the crowd can free ride on expert investors with the incentive
and expertise to monitor a crowdfunding investment. It is more likely
that those investors can be the ones who monitor on behalf of all
investors, thus reducing agency costs for the first-in crowd. This will be
particularly true should crowdfunding prove a gateway to angel/VC
money.248 Even without solving the agency cost problem, however,
curation by funding portals and experts is an important step toward
reducing information asymmetry in the private venture capital mold.249

245. Accelerators are intensive boot camps for startups, unlike incubators which merely collect
startups in the same office space. See generally RANDALL STROSS, THE LAUNCH PAD: INSIDE Y
COMBINATOR, SILICON VALLEY’S MOST EXCLUSIVE SCHOOL FOR STARTUPS 41 (2013).
246. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 236, at 1502 (“As WeFunder
advertises, investment clubs allow investors to follow ‘the wisdom of the experts.’”) (emphasis in
original); see also Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future is Here, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 542 (2015) (“AngelList’s current model utilizes two investment
strategies: ‘Angel Followed Deals’ and ‘Angel Advised Deals.’ In Angel Followed Deals, investors
are given the option to see which angels invest in ventures, allowing the independent investors to
follow the angels’ lead.”).
247. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, supra note 68, at 902 (“[T]he JOBS Act
specifically authorizes civil actions for fraud against issuers, directors, and officers of companies
that mislead crowdfunding investors.”).
248. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Signals, supra note 62 (arguing that crowdfunding can have a
positive effect on a startup’s chance at attracting follow-on investment).
249. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, supra note 68, at 912 (“[T]his ‘revolutionary’
idea of a totally inclusive marketplace for entrepreneurial finance was snuffed out without even
being given a chance.”); Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 236, at 1485
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CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurial ecosystems are complicated. Even a look at different
regions within the United States, such as Silicon Valley and Route 128,
reveal important differences in labor mobility and historical
circumstances.250 International comparisons of entrepreneurial
ecosystems are further complicated by differences in culture,
institutional design, and macroeconomic factors. This Article has
focused on one piece of the puzzle—how investors mitigate information
asymmetry and agency costs when selecting and monitoring high-risk
startups.
This Article has argued that, after comparing public and private
venture capital approaches, the U.S. system of private venture capital
clearly has the better track record in vaulting growth startups to
successful outcomes. U.S. startups, including Google, Facebook, and
Tesla Motors, are some of the world’s largest and most successful
companies. Conversely, no junior stock exchange abroad has produced
anything close to the U.S. success. Therefore, it is a fortuitous turn that
U.S. crowdfunding, the new kid of entrepreneurial finance, is now
relying more on reputational intermediation and expert signaling and
less on public law solutions as it continues to develop.

(“[C]rowdfunding as implemented will more closely resemble angel and venture capital (‘VC’)
investing models rather than something revolutionary.”).
250. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE
AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994); Gilson, Legal Infrastructure, supra
note 4, at 586–94.

